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Abstract 
This paper explores the evolutionary process underlying the development of the triple helix innovation 
system and the role of knowledge intermediaries in the process. It draws on the experience of 
knowledge network development in an SME cluster in the Thai hard disk drive industry. Conceptually, 
the evolutionary process starts with inter-firm networks, which occur in the form of supply chain-based 
vertical links and trade association or cluster-based horizontal links. These evolve into triple helix 
networks and culminate into the triple helix innovation system through the agency of network 
dynamics. Intermediaries enhance network development as sponsors, providing funds; as brokers, 
closing and bridging structural holes that disconnect network players; and as boundary spanners, 
facilitating knowledge circulation. The case study suggests that knowledge network development in 
Thailand has a long way to go before morphing into the triple helix innovation system. Some evidence 
of network dynamics was nonetheless detected; but for lack of trust in the triple helix culture, the 
fledgling network dynamics fizzled out when the government prop, which initiated the process, was 
withdrawn. The paper concludes by highlighting the need for policy to promote the culture of trust 
among network players and for knowledge intermediaries to be less ad hoc and more systemic in their 
organisation and operation.   
 
Keywords: Triple Helix; network development; innovation system; intermediaries; structural holes; learning; 
knowledge circulation; trust; hard disk drive industry; Thailand 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is twofold: to show the development of triple helix knowledge 
network as a basis for the evolution of the triple helix innovation system; and 
knowledge intermediaries as policy vehicles for network development through the 
bridging and closing of µVWUXFWXUDO KROHV¶. An important distinction is thus drawn 
between µtriple helix¶ as a knowledge network and µtriple helix¶ as a system of 
innovation. This is particularly relevant to discussions of triple helix in the context of 
developing countries where, for reasons relating to prevailing socio-economic and 
cultural conditions, policy would be rather more effective pursuing development of 
the former than the latter as a matter of priority. 
The triple helix knowledge network is an evolving phenomenon in developing 
countries. This is reflected in the growing policy support for the expansion of 
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university-industry cooperation. However, what little university-industry interaction 
there has been to date in developing countries has for the most part been driven by 
personal initiatives and conducted on ad-hoc basis. Much of the problem underlying 
this situation relates to shortfalls in institutional capacity development in these 
countries. For this problem to be overcome, and for developing countries to benefit 
from integration of the activities of knowledge creation and knowledge use, the role 
of policy in knowledge network development would help to mitigate the effects of 
institutional rigidities and the fragmentation of activities in the domains of knowledge 
production and use. The question, however, remains: how effective are governments 
in developing countries in playing interventionist roles to leverage the evolution of 
triple helix knowledge networks? Given the widely acknowledged failure of both 
governments and markets in the allocation and management of resources in 
developing countries, the question at stake is how best the mechanisms of intervention 
can be designed to promote the development of a sustainable institutional framework 
for knowledge production and its use.  
This paper aims to look into the significance of the roles of innovation 
intermediaries in bridging and closing µVWUXFWXUDOKROHV¶ that disconnect actors in the 
triple helix network (Burt, 2000, 2001, 2004), with particular reference to the case of 
a cluster of SMEs in WKH 7KDL KDUG GLVN GULYH +'' LQGXVWU\ µ6WUXFWXUDO KROHV¶
prevail in the absence of well-developed networks, leaving firms disconnected and 
compartmentalised, and so without network safeguards against the risk of exposure to 
adverse business situations in which opportunistic behaviour and free-riding 
possibilities abound µ6WUXFWXUDO KROHV¶ thus create a barrier against knowledge 
exchange; and this would add to the transactions cost of firms and make them rather 
reluctant to innovate, lest they be hostage to free-riders :KHUH µVWUXFWXUDO KROHV¶
 3 
abound, they constrain the process of knowledge transmission and the evolutionary 
process in the development of knowledge networks. But they also offer opportunities 
for network development and policy initiatives to promote institutional capacity 
building as a basis for innovation, technological progress and socio-economic 
development.    
Thailand is one of the rapidly emerging developing countries aspiring to qualify 
DVDQµ$VLDQWLJHU¶HFRQRP\,QWKHSDVWHFRQRPLFJURZWKLQ7KDLODQGGHULYHGIURP
the accumulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Diao et al., 2006). However, in 
recent years, the government has come up with policy initiatives to shift the economy 
from an FDI-based to a knowledge-based growth trajectory (Promwong, 2001). 
Consequently, the cluster approach has been adopted since 2004 to develop and 
upgrade technological capabilities through the promotion of networking within and 
between industries and complementary institutions, namely universities, research 
centres and government and non-government agencies. The focus of this paper is on a 
specific aspect of the industrial development experience of Thailand as a point of 
reference for analysing the role of intermediaries in the formation and evolution of 
triple helix networks that constitute a strategic basis for knowledge creation, 
knowledge exchange, knowledge use and the development of a triple helix innovation 
system. 
The remainder of this paper is four parts. The part following this introduction 
discusses the conceptual framework, including review of the evolution of inter-firm 
networks into triple helix innovation system; the characteristics and significance of 
structural holes in networks; and the roles played by innovation intermediaries in the 
transformation process. The third part briefly describes the method used in this study. 
The fourth part presents a case study drawing on the network experience of the Thai 
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hard disk drive (HDD) industry. The last part presents the conclusions and policy 
implications of the issues raised in the paper.   
 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 Evolution of triple helix innovation system 
Triple helix knowledge networks would conceptually be expected to derive from µpre-
existing inter-firm networks¶, including vertical supply chain and horizontal industrial 
association networks (Nakwa et al., 2012). Knowledge networks can be categorised 
into three dimensions (Pöyhönen and Smedlund, 2004; Nakwa et al., 2012). First, 
horizontal industrial networks consist of firms in the same industry or at the same 
level of value chain. Firms in the same industry with similar knowledge base can 
reduce the costs and lead times of technological development through the 
coordination of efforts in some common areas of activity (Robertson and Langlois, 
1995). Second, vertical value chains involve trading relationships of firms with 
suppliers and customers. Both suppliers and customers influence technological 
development at the level of the firm. Customers exercise this influence through the 
expression of their requirements (Gemünden et al., 1996), and suppliers, through the 
adoption of new technologies thereby changing the supply chain dynamics (Freeman, 
1991). The third category of inter-firm relationship, which occupies the diagonal 
space (see Figure 1), combines the vertical and horizontal elements as components of 
the institutional sphere of production and wealth creation. The evolution of this sphere 
is conditional on its alignment to the overarching knowledge and policy and 
governance spheres. 
Vertical and horizontal inter-firm networks predate triple helix networks and 
are referred to in this paper as µpre-existing networks¶. Of their own, such networks 
offer limited scope for growth and deep cooperation. This is because the firms within 
 5 
them do rarely come with diverse knowledge and resource profiles and have limited 
exposure to sources of new ideas. Network development through knowledge 
exchange has, however, its own dynamics, which cuts across knowledge boundaries 
to involve heterogeneous players. These are represented occupying the diagonal space 
in Figure 1. Conceptually, the triple helix knowledge network derives from the 
integration of activities originating from horizontal industrial networks, vertical value 
chain networks and other supporting institutions from the knowledge and policy and 
governance spheres (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Innovation networks (a) Supply chain network (b) Industrial Network (c) Triple helix 
network 
 
This type of knowledge network, which exposes  firms to a wide range of actors 
with a diverse set of knowledge content and structure, experience, competencies and 
resources, has the potential to generate network dynamics (Nakwa et al., 2012). 
Interactions between firms across different value chains and industries and with 
different technological paths can open new technological opportunities that provide 
the basis for radical innovation (Pyka, 2002). Apart from inter-firm cooperation, the 
interactions along the diagonal space would be expected to involve other institutions, 
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such as universities and government agencies. These two institutional players together 
with industry and business make up the triple helix network. Universities are 
knowledge producers feeding networks with new knowledge categories. Business and 
industry use the knowledge they acquire to create wealth; and the role of government 
is to provide resources and policy and institutional mechanisms to broaden and 
deepen inter-firm networks and to stimulate knowledge circulation across institutional 
boundaries (Gemünden et al., 1996). The combination of diverse knowledge strands 
along the diagonal space generates network dynamics that are capable of bringing 
forth new technological paradigms and trajectories (Dosi, 1982; Menzel and Fornahl, 
2007; Leydesdorff and Zawdie, 2010).   
Networking between triple helix institutional actors enhances the learning 
process and contributes to the development of a dynamic culture of creativity and 
innovativeness. This happens because networking allows the convergence of diverse 
knowledge streams, which is necessary for the synthesis of ideas to culminate in 
innovation (Balthasar et al., 2000; Madill et al., 2004; Knorringa and van Staveren, 
2006; Capaldo, 2007; Menzel and Fornahl, 2007). It is this synthesis of heterogeneous 
knowledge streams that constitutes network dynamics underlying the process of 
knowledge conversion and creation in the triple helix system. 
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), knowledge creation involves a 
dynamic learning process in which tacit knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge 
through socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation. Through these 
iterative processes, the knowledge of individuals can be combined to create group, 
organisational and inter-organisational knowledge in successive loops of learning, 
thus adding to the knowledge stock of organisations that function as network players 
(Bell and Albu, 1999; Gilsing, 2005). It is through networking that the diverse and 
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non-redundant knowledge streams and competencies of heterogeneous actors are 
combined to provide the basis for the emergence of network dynamics and for the 
occurrence of innovation ( Gilsing, 2005; Beckman and Haunschild, 2002).  
However, for firms to learn from institutional players with different cognitive 
backgrounds, they would need to enhance their absorptive capacities through 
investments in equipment, machinery and human resource development (Gilsing, 
2005). These would enable them to create a common cognitive framework; build trust 
and mutual understanding among themselves; and exchange their tacit knowledge 
through socialisation in such forms as cross-licensing. Newly combined knowledge 
categories at organisational and inter-organisational levels are significant for their 
contribution to total productivity growth across the economy. 
The depth of knowledge created by a firm as a network player depends on the 
level and mode of organisational learning, which in turn depends on the cognitive 
distance of the sources of knowledge. Thus, within a knowledge network where there 
is cognitive closeness, which RIIHUV VFRSH IRU µstrong ties¶, firms would engage in 
µsingle loop¶ learning (Argyris and Schoen, 1978). Single loop learning results in the 
effective use of acquired knowledge through a somewhat linear process of 
downloading and redesigning. ,Q WKLV PRGH WKH OHDUQLQJ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V H[LVWLQJ
norms, procedures, policies and goals are not challenged and modified. Learning is at 
EHVW µDGDSWLYH¶ DQG µQRQ-VWUDWHJLF¶ 0DVRQ  Not surprisingly, this model of 
linear learning hardly adds to the depth and breadth of organisational knowledge. Nor 
does it involve shifts in knowledge paradigms.  
On the other hand, knowledge transactions across networks are complex and 
non-linear and would rather conform to the µdouble loop¶ and µtriple loop¶ learning 
modes, which turn on awareness of knowledge gaps (Nevis et al., 1995);  call for the 
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introduction of new structures and strategies for learning (Argyris et al, 1985; Argyris, 
1992, 1994; Flood and Romm, 1996; Snell and Chak, 1998; Pahl-Wostl , 2009); and 
have, therefore, the potential of producing incremental and radical innovation. Thus, 
WKHµGRXEOHORRS¶DQGµWULSOHORRS¶PRGHVFRQVWLWXWHWKHHVVHQFHRIG\QDPLFOHDUQLQJ
which enables firms to create, extend or modify and hence deepen and widen their 
knowledge base by reconfiguring and realigning their learning routines to changes in 
the wider context of business and policy environments that bear on their organisation 
and management systems. As such, dynamic learning is essentially geared to the 
processes of knowledge exploration, knowledge assimilation and knowledge 
exploitation (Lewin et al., 2011). These are processes that would be expected to arise 
in the bridging and closure of structural holes. 
 
2.2 Structural holes: closure and bridging 
The effective combination of knowledge deriving from heterogeneous actors is 
constrained by differences in the culture and knowledge base of the network players; 
and also by institutional rigidities arising from the prevalence of structural holes. 
These constraints are mitigated by the intervention of intermediaries to close and 
bridge structural holes through the formation of µstrong ties¶ and µweak ties¶ (Burt, 
2001).  When intermediaries close structural holes among firms with knowledge 
proximity, they create µstrong ties¶ that provide the scope for intra-industry 
collaboration akin to the inter-firm horizontal network in Figure 1. When they span 
across knowledge boundaries to bridge structural holes, they create µweak WLHV¶ that 
provide firms access to new and diverse knowledge sources.  
Structural holes occurring among firms within spheres of knowledge proximity 
are categorised µinternal¶ and those that occur among firms and organisations 
between knowledge spheres are categorised µexternal¶ (Burt, 2001; Gilsing, 2005). 
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Internal structural holes among firms with knowledge proximity arise from the lack of 
trust. Where internal structural holes prevail, firms would be unwilling to share 
knowledge with one another. This situation leads to a sub-optimal level of knowledge 
circulation among firms within the knowledge sphere and hence to sub-optimal levels 
of network capital and technological capability development (Johnson, 2009). 
Intermediaries can close these internal structural holes and transform them into strong 
ties that provide the basis for micro knowledge circulation (Ahuja, 2000; Etzkowitz 
and Dzisah, 2008). Knorringa and van Staveren (2006) refer to this closure process as 
µERQGLQJVRFLDOFDSLWDO¶ 
External structural holes arise due to differences in culture, resources, 
competencies and knowledge profiles between players in different institutional 
spheres or knowledge networks. These differences may enhance cognitive distance 
and keep firms far apart; but network players would use these as potential sources of 
new and non-redundant knowledge. But for this to happen, intermediaries would be 
expected to bridge external structural holes (Burt, 2000) and transform them into 
µweak ties¶ that provide the basis for macro knowledge circulation (Etzkowitz and 
Dzisah, 2008) and create the opportunity for  innovation through the combination of 
heterogeneous knowledge categories (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Pyka, 2002; 
Knorringa and van Staveren, 2006).  
As can be seen in Figure 2, a triple helix network contains both strong and weak 
ties. Strong social capital within institutional spheres facilitates communication and 
collective actions; and the complementarity of heterogeneous actors with different 
knowledge profiles provides the condition for new knowledge creation and 
innovation.  
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Figure 2:  Network closure within institutional actors and brokerage between institutional actors in 
triple helix 
 
 
2.3 Roles of intermediaries in promoting triple helix networks 
Triple helix networks are dysfunctional where µVWUXFWXUDOKROHV¶remain unclosed and 
unbridged. Intermediaries are in this case necessary to transform inter-firm networks 
into triple helix networks by bringing other institutional actors, like universities and 
government agencies, into the picture (Nakwa et al., 2012). In this transformation 
process, intermediaries play roles as sponsors, providing guidelines and funds to 
promote network development; as brokers, linking actors and building collaboration 
mechanisms; and as boundary spanners, providing operational services to facilitate 
knowledge circulation. Intermediaries can also play these roles in the evolution of 
triple helix networks into triple helix system by stimulating the emergence of network 
dynamics through the closing and bridging of structural holes.  
Intermediaries play a sponsoring role by providing funding to create collective 
actions for building trust, thus closing internal structural holes. They would also 
promote the case for investments in machinery and equipment and human 
development as a strategy for reducing cognitive distance or differences between 
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actors in different institutional spheres, thus bridging external structural holes. They 
play a brokering role by connecting internal structural holes and creating collective 
actions within institutional spheres, and also by connecting external structural holes 
through specific investments in human resource development and the acquisition of 
new software and hardware technologies that have the effect of improving the 
absorptive capacities of network players. They play a boundary-spanning role by 
providing operational services that: (1) facilitate the exchange of tacit knowledge of 
actors within institutional spheres through socialisation; (2) convert tacit knowledge 
shared by players within institutional spheres into explicit knowledge through 
externalisation; (3) help upgrade technological capability of network players across 
knowledge boundaries by reducing cognitive distance and replacing them with weak 
ties, thus stimulating combination of the diverse knowledge strands of heterogeneous 
actors; and (4) help commercialise newly combined knowledge or innovation, thus 
creating economic value through µinternalisation¶ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Nakwa and Zawdie, 2012).     
In addition, intermediaries are instrumental in the creation of network dynamics 
through the iterative transformation of knowledge within triple helix networks. This 
iterative transformation involves NQRZOHGJH H[SORUDWLRQ DFURVV µweak ties¶ and 
knowledge exploitation within µstrong ties¶ (Capaldo, 2007; Harryson et al., 2008) 
within the triple helix network (see Figure 3). Intermediaries can stimulate knowledge 
exploration across networks through socialisation and externalisation, thereby 
transforming µFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVHG QHWZRUNV¶ ZLWK VWUXFWXUDO KROHV into µORRVHly 
FRQQHFWHGQHWZRUNV¶ (Gilsing, 2005).  The process of knowledge exploitation involves 
learning through the combination of diverse categories of knowledge, and the 
subsequent internalisation and commercialisation of these by individual firms, thus 
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providing the basis for the next round of knowledge exploration and knowledge 
exploitation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Intermediaries thus set in PRWLRQ WKH QHWZRUN G\QDPLFV LQ ZKLFK µVWURQJO\
FRQQHFWHGQHWZRUNV¶WXUQWRµFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVHGQHWZRUNV¶to capture QHZµVWUXFWXUDO
KROHV¶ and continue the process of knowledge combination and innovation on a 
sustainable basis (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3:  Roles of intermediaries in stimulating network dynamics through the closure and bridging of 
structural holes 
 
3. Methodology 
This paper is part of a larger study on knowledge network development in Thailand 
funded by the Thai Royal Government (Nakwa, 2013). The paper makes use of the 
hard disk drive (HDD) industry as a case study. The HDD industry was selected on 
grounds that it was one of areas where MNCs operate in Thailand, and is as such 
considered to be of strategic significance in view of the GRYHUQPHQW¶V policy 
commitment to promote the incorporation of local SMEs into the global value chains 
of MNCs through the intervention of knowledge intermediaries.  
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The study is of the explorative type, and the method of analysis is essentially 
qualitative. Data collection for the study was conducted mainly through interviews of 
prominent individuals representing organisations and institutions based on the 
snowball sampling method. The interview-based survey was conducted intermittently 
between February and August 2012 as part of the wider industry study (Nakwa, 
2013). First, an intermediary organisation closely linked with the activities of the 
HDD sector was identified, and a key individual representing the organisation was 
selected to elicit information on the experiences of intermediaries in the process of 
network building and brokering relationships between triple helix actors. The 
individual from the intermediary organisation was also asked to suggest names of key 
persons from academic, government and industrial sectors who would be 
knowledgeable enough to speak about the role of their respective institutions in 
network formation and in the process of knowledge exchange along the triple helix 
network. Interviewees were contacted to make appointments for face-to-face 
interviews. All but one offered to be available for face-to-face interviews. The 
interviews took about 45-60 minutes. The one respondent who would not be available 
for face-to-face interview however agreed to be available for telephone interview. In 
all, five individuals were interviewed. Moreover, pertinent archival documents, 
including annual plans and reports and observation notes were employed as sources of 
data. 
The interviews involved questions that were semi-structured and open-ended. The 
questions asked sought to explore the experiences of interviewees in the formation 
and operation of networks and the roles of the interviewees and their institutions. 
They also queried the roles and motivation of interviewees in the process of network 
formation and as to how long they were engaged in the process. In addition, 
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individuals were asked about the roles, activities and knowledge exchange efforts of 
important network actors other than the organisations they represented. Interviewees 
were also asked to identify intermediaries in their networks; to assess the capabilities 
and resources of such intermediaries; and to evaluate the state of network 
development, the problems and obstacles of network management and the directions 
in which the networks were likely to evolve.  
The data obtained from the interviews was synthesised and used as a basis for an 
analytical discussion of a case study relating to an HDD manufacturing MNC and a 
cluster of SMEs organised to function as one of its suppliers. The analytical 
discussion is based on the conceptual framework developed in this paper. The case 
study method used in this study provides details of real-life events that would help 
bring out the complex features underlying the experiences in network formation and 
its management.  
In the following section of this paper, the case study method is used in which the 
issue of triple helix network development is qualitatively analysed based on a 
synthesis of information drawn from the interview-based survey.  The case study 
approach is used to provide a contextual understanding of the evolution of the triple 
helix system in the Thai industrial sector, in general, and the HDD sub-sector, in 
particular.  
4. The case of HDD industry in Thailand 
4.1 Current status of Thai HDD industry 
Thailand is the largest manufacturing base of HDD industry in the world. In 2010, it 
held a 42 per cent market share of world production with export value at 596,677 
million baht (approximately 20,000 million USD) (see Table 1). As can be seen from 
Table 1, HDD products and parts account for about one-third of the export of the 
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electronics industry, which is the second largest industry of Thailand. The HDD 
industry and its support industries create approximately 150,000 jobs (CPMO, 2011). 
In addition to its contribution to industrial employment and output, the HDD industry 
contributes to the development of technological capability in Thailand by providing a 
basis for international technology transfer to the country.  
Table 1: Production and export of Thai HDD industry 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Production volume (million pieces) 152.8 204 247.2 258.2 280.6 
Production growth (%) - 33.5 21.2 4.4 8.7 
Export of HDD products and parts 
(million Baht) 
559,739 597,059 605,314 545,468 596,677 
Proportion of HDD export to 
electronics export 
35.7 36.2 37.4 37.6 35.2 
Market share (%) N/A N/A N/A 44 42 
Source: Cluster and Programme Management Office, NSTDA (CPMO, 2011) 
Although Thailand has long been the manufacturing base of most HDD makers, 
the value added created in the in the industry accounts for about one per cent of the 
total HDD export value (Kohpaiboon, 2009). Most HDD makers and their first tier 
suppliers are MNCs who chose to invest in Thailand to take advantage of the low 
wage regime in the country. Local firms do not have the capability to produce HDD 
parts due to lack of infrastructure for implementing high precision technology.  
Cluster development policy has been pursued in Thailand since 2006 with the 
aim to promote the development, inter alia, of the HDD industry. The Hard Disk 
Drive Institute (HDDI), a hybrid organisation, was established following 
consultations between representatives of industry, government agencies and 
universities to formulate mechanisms for collaboration and for the management of the 
HDD cluster. During the first phase of the HDD cluster development (2006-2010), 
emphasis of policy was on three technological development activities, including 
human resource development, R&D and supply chain development (see Figure 4). 
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Both government and industry played major roles in human resource development 
that provided the basis for upgrading the technological capability of firms in the HDD 
and the support industries. It can be seen from Figure 4 that the value of government 
support for R&D and supply chain development activities was significantly more than 
the matching support provided by industry.  
During the second phase of cluster development, government support was 
specifically targeted to achieve deeper technological development in HDD production 
and also in the production of automated equipment by the local SMEs on the HDD 
supply chain (CPMO, 2011). The case study of TH Alliance discussed below was 
used as a pilot project for developing a supply chain system to serve MNCs and 
enhance the value added effect of investment in HDD production. 
 
Figure 4: Government support for network development in HDD industry and industry 
matching fund 
 
Source: Cluster and Programme Management Office, NSTDA (CPMO, 2011) 
 
4.2 Case study: TH Alliance as a triple helix network 
4.2.1 Establishment of TH Alliance 
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TH Alliance is a pilot project involving the horizontal integration of four local SMEs 
engaged in the manufacturing of automative products. It was initiated as a cluster by 
the Hard Disk Drive Institute (HDDI) to serve as a supplier to the HDD maker, and so 
to enhance the backward linkage effect of the HDD industry., The HDDI also set up 
Industry/University Cooperative Research Centres (I/UCRCs) as brokering 
intermediaries in three universities to with the aim to integrate the activities of local 
SMEs into the supply chain of the HDD makers. 
7KH ,QVWLWXWH RI )LHOG 5RERWLFV ),%2 LQ .LQJ 0RQJNXW¶V 8QLYHUVLW\ RI
Technology, one of the three I/UCRCs, identified a list of potential local firms with 
the basic capability to manufacture automative products. It provided the list to an 
HDD maker to select potential suppliers to establish an alliance of local firms by 
integrating their production lines in order to enable them achieve economies of scale. 
Four SMEs were selected to establish TH Alliance to provide automation products for 
an HDD maker. Some of the SMEs had competitive advantage in manufacturing 
capability and others in design capability. The four SMEs in the TH Alliance set out 
their machines in particular lines to form a joint station at a site near an HDD maker. 
Then, as a boundary-spanning intermediary, FIBO facilitated knowledge circulation 
between MNCs and local SMEs by providing research support to the local firms. This 
offered the local firms opportunities for reverse engineering and the acquisition of 
knowledge that would enable them to replicate some imported machines and develop 
their technological capabilities in the process. 
 
 
4.2.2 Role of intermediaries  
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The µpre-existing networks¶ of the HDD industry in Thailand involve inter-firm 
networks ± i.e. the vertical value chain between HDD makers and MNC suppliers; 
and a horizontal industrial association represented by the Thai branch of International 
Disk Drive Equipment and Materials Association (IDEMA), which was established 
by four HDD makers to develop human resources and share information about global 
trends of the HDD market. Prior to intervention by the HDDI, the MNCs 
manufacturing HDD would not trust the local SMEs because the local firms were 
were perceived to be too risky to do business with in the absence of any institutional 
and organisational safeguards or network capital. Moreover, they lacked quality 
assurance, inspection equipment and the ability to produce very high precision 
products.  
The triple helix network that developed around the HDD industry was at best 
rudimentary. Few universities had forged links with the MNCs in the industry in the 
form of contract research. A government agency, namely the Thailand Board of 
Investment, provided tax incentives for technology and human development activities 
of these MNCs. However, this compartmentalised network with both internal and 
external structural holes did not promote value creation and technological capability 
development due to the absence of knowledge circulation. Consequently, the 
knowledge stock of local firms hardly increased (Bell and Albu, 1999). Against this 
background, industrial policy sought to stimulate technological capability 
development in SMEs by integrating them into global supply chain systems through 
association with MNCs and also by actively engaging them in knowledge transactions 
with other firms and local institutions as network players.  This arrangement, which 
would benefit SMEs to tap into the global knowledge network, was implemented by 
intermediaries through the bridging and closure of structural holes.  
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Prior to the establishment of TH Alliance as a consortium, there were four 
SMEs who knew each other as firms in same industry, albeit informally and without 
any intention to cooperate. These four SMEs, set apart from one another, featured 
evidence of internal structural holes. The Thai Government set up the HDDI, which, 
as a sponsoring intermediary, assigned FIBO as a brokering intermediary to propose 
the establishment of TH Alliance and to create mechanisms for collaboration. HDDI 
then provided funding for FIBO to play a boundary-spanning role, providing technical 
assistance for the SMEs constituting TH Alliance to work on the joint project. Thus 
by acting as sponsors, brokers and boundary spanners, intermediaries sought to 
connect internal structural holes, and so to incorporate the SMEs into a knowledge 
network that would ensure their knowledge stock is continually refreshed.  
Prior to the formation of TH Alliance, the SMEs did not have any links with 
universities. For HDDI, this represented an external structural hole to be bridged. As a 
broker, FIBO invited the local SMEs to participate in the supply chain development 
programme with the aim to identify potential firms to work with MNCs. The selected 
SMEs were trained by FIBO and were financially supported by HDDI to develop 
upstream products for the production of HDD. Through this bridging process, FIBO 
played an essential role as a broker in transforming external structural holes into 
µweak ties¶ through the formation of a knowledge network between the four selected 
SMEs, an MNC, HDDI and FIBO itself. FIBO also operated as a boundary spanner 
promoting the circulation of knowledge among the SMEs.  
 
 
4.2.3 Roles of weak and strong ties in creating  network dynamics 
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Network dynamics arise from iterative processes of knowledge creation and 
combination consequent upon interactions between heterogeneous actors on the 
knowledge network. In the case of TH Alliance, intermediaries played three roles in 
transforming compartmentalised networks into a more coherent network through the 
bridging and closure of structural holes. In its role as a sponsoring intermediary, 
+'',VXSSRUWHGµVSHFLILF LQYHVWPHQWs¶ to reduce the cognitive distance between the 
four SMEs, the client MNC and FIBO through the collaborative mechanisms created 
by FIBO as a broker. These µspecific investments¶ were directed, inter alia, at human 
resource development to upgrade the technological capability of engineers in the four 
SMEs. In addition, FIBO exercised a boundary-spanning role by providing training 
and technology transfer services to SMEs to enable them to participate in the supply 
chain of the MNC. The MNC was consequently connected to the four SMEs through 
the specification of its demand for intermediate products. Socialisation between 
FIBO, the four SMEs and the MNC occurred in these collaborative activities, 
transforming the compartmentalised network into a loosely connected network. 
Other modes of knowledge conversion related to the exploitation of knowledge 
which occurred through the iterative processes of externalisation, combination and 
internalisation. With the supportive intervention of intermediaries, these processes 
would result in the transformation of loosely connected networks into strongly 
connected networks. As a brokering intermediary, FIBO promoted the creation of 
links among players including the four SMEs in TH Alliance and the MNC. FIBO 
also used its resources and boundary spanning expertise to facilitate knowledge 
conversion processes within the production sphere. For example, in the externalisation 
process, FIBO researchers helped firms to conduct reverse engineering of imported 
machines used by an HDD maker and transferred this knowledge and blueprint to the 
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four SMEs in TH Alliance. The SMEs in TH Alliance would then claim intellectual 
property rights (IPR) on the new automotive products, deriving from a synthesis of 
the reverse engineering process. The SMEs integrated their production lines to 
produce the patented machines. HDDI provided financial support for the building of 
prototypes; and FIBO assisted in the production of documents for quality certification 
that would enhance the profiles of local firms and their eligibility to participate in the 
supply chains of MNCs. At the end of the project, the MNC purchased seven of the 
ten patented machines produced by the SMEs. Thus, the first loop of knowledge 
creation saw the individual knowledge strands of FIBO and the four SMEs combined 
into inter-organisation knowledge, creating new knowledge and product innovation.  
However, there is no evidence of continuity in the knowledge conversion and 
creation cycle ratchetting up in a spiral mode as postulated by Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995). This appears to suggest that the network dynamics created in by the SMEs in 
TH Alliance was not robust enough to be sustained. A major problem behind this state 
of affairs is the lack of trust or social capital among players in the network that 
prompted the MNC not to be readily forthcoming in its relationship with the SMEs, in 
the first place. This problem was later exacerbated by the reduction of government 
support for network development.  
After selling its patents to the HDD maker as exclusive user, TH Alliance was 
unable to further reproduce and sell those seven innovated machines to other HDD 
makers and other manufacturers in other industries. This left TH Alliance with the 
option to bid for new projects and develop new machines. However, some members 
of the Alliance felt that they did not derive any benefits from the business of the 
Alliance and were reluctant to continue their being part of it. This could happen 
because the establishment of TH Alliance was underpinned not by trust among the 
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local firms but by transient pecuniary incentives induced by the provision of 
government support (Murdoch, 2000). Nor was there much trust between the SMEs 
and the MNC, their client. In other words, the socialisation process in this project did 
not really help to reduce the cognitive distance between the SMEs themselves and 
between the SMEs and their client MNC. For all that, the system thrived, if 
unsustainably, with knowledge flowing in one direction from FIBO to the SMEs. 
Eventually, when the Government withdrew its support ± perhaps more for budgetary 
reasons than for lack of interest in knowledge network development ±TH Alliance 
ceased to function as an effective network player; and the knowledge creation loop 
was aborted after the first round of activities of socialisation, externalisation, 
combination and internalisation that culminated in the sales of seven innovated 
machines to the MNC. Thus, the network dynamics, which appeared to have had a 
promising start, failed to sustain the cumulative process of knowledge creation 
through the mechanism of learning by socialisation, externalisation, combination and 
internalisation.  
Following the cut in government support and disengagement of the MNC, the 
SMEs regrouped to develop strong ties and create a new alliance to combine 
knowledge and innovate. Thus, on the back of acquired experience, two of the SMEs 
started a new alliance to bid for new projects from the same HDD maker. Another 
SME partnered with an overseas company to establish a joint venture as a basis for 
technology transfer. Such enterprising initiatives show some evidence of learning 
from experience. However, without ready access to sources of knowledge production, 
inter-firm networks face the risk of being locked into old trajectories that would make 
it difficult for firms to engage in the knowledge combination process through the 
closure and bridging of structural holes.  
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For network development to be effective, the intervention of intermediaries is 
crucial. Thus, the link the HDDI helped to create between the four SMEs and the 
university-based intermediary, FIBO, would need to be strengthened, but on the basis 
of mutual trust and not merely on the back of government support. Trust would 
provide the basis for the SMEs to have sustainable access to sources of knowledge 
production, and for FIBO and similar intermediaries to be agents for the development 
of entrepreneurial university culture.    
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has attempted to shed some light on the significance of the roles of 
knowledge intermediaries in the evolution of triple helix network into triple helix 
innovation system. As already discussed, this evolutionary process occurs through the 
bridging and closure of structural holes. In developing countries, where triple helix 
networks are characteristically dysfunctional, intermediaries are necessary to bridge 
and close structural holes and then to nurture and grow them into weak and strong 
ties. Intermediaries can also stimulate the emergence of network dynamics through 
the bridging of compartmentalised networks of heterogeneous players.  
The case study of TH Alliance discussed in this paper shows that intervention of 
intermediaries based on short-term-oriented government funding may, in the best of 
circumstances, help produce the first cycle of knowledge creation and network 
transformation that, however, may not be robust enough to produce the drive for 
subsequent cycles. The evidence deriving from the case discussed in this paper shows 
that the subsequent cycles of knowledge creation and network transformation would 
be aborted in the absence of trust and possibly also the provision of government 
support. It is also apparent from the case that top-down policy could not be expected 
to create real trust and bonding among network players to provide the basis for the 
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generation of network dynamics. However, the experience of the TH Alliance shows, 
if in a limited way, the significance of the contributions that players from the 
knowledge and government spheres in the triple helix network can make to promote 
the development of industrial activities through the process of knowledge acquisition 
and transformation. For instance, some SMEs realised the benefits of engagement 
with actors on the triple helix network and continued to pursue this engagement in 
spite of their earlier experience with their MNC client and FIBO, the university-based 
brokering intermediary. There is, however, no evidence to show that this continued 
networking engagement was a success. What is theoretically and empirically valid is 
that network development based on trust and the accumulation of social capital is 
crucial for the development of triple helix networks and their ultimate evolution into 
the triple helix innovation system. The converse is also true ± that lack of trust would 
fragment networks or render them sterile and incapable of evolving into the triple 
helix system through dynamic learning via the processes of bridging and closure of 
structural holes.   
The problem in developing countries is one of determining where government-
driven, top-down initiatives should stop to give way to bottom-up and grassroots-
based initiatives in network development. In either case, knowledge intermediaries are 
necessary to promote network development as sponsors, brokers and boundary-
spanners. But knowledge intermediaries would be effective when they are more 
disposed to the bottom-up than to the top-down culture of decision-making systems. It 
can, therefore, be argued that governments in developing countries would create less 
of a burden on themselves and contribute significantly more to the development of 
knowledge networks, in general, and triple helix networks, in particular, if they 
promoted market-oriented intermediaries to provide bridging and closure services in 
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network development. Thus, for example, venture capital can be called in to serve as 
sponsors, while universities and private consultants can be trusted to intermediate as 
brokers and boundary spanners. This arrangement would have a transformative effect 
on the culture underlying the functions of the triple helix institutional actors ± 
industry would aspire to be innovative and competitive in its role as the agent of 
wealth creation; universities would seek to be entrepreneurial in their role as 
producers of knowledge and places of useful learning; and governments would seek to 
provide broad policy frameworks and regulatory measures to enable institutional 
players interact to exchange knowledge and generate innovation on a sustainable 
basis. 
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